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C ~ n ~ t i t ~ t i ~ n a l  Law-ENTITLEMENT DOCTRINE-MICHIGAN COM- 
PULSORY NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE NSURANCE LAW VIOLATES DUE PRO- 
CESS-Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 
72 (1978). 
Recent actions by courts and Congress have caused some 
commentators to conclude that the "death knell" of no-fault in- 
surance has sounded.' The most significant case to date finding 
a portion of a state no-fault plan unconstitutional is the decision 
of the Michigan Supreme Court in Shavers v. Attorney General? 
Although the court found the overall purposes of the Michigan 
No-Fault Act3 constitutional, the actual mechanisms for provid- 
ing the compulsory automobile insurance were adjudged defi- 
cient. The failure of the mechanisms to provide essential proce- 
dures to guarantee fair insurance rates and the proper availability 
of insurance was held to deprive citizens of due process of law 
under the Michigan and United States Constitutions. The Michi- 
gan court is the first to hold a no-fault plan's regulatory scheme 
unconstitutional on that ground. 
The plaintiffs in Shavers brought the suit as a class action 
before Michigan's No-Fault Act became effective, seeking a de- 
claratory judgment concerning the constitutionality of the Act 
and an injunction against its enforcement. The No-Fault Act 
went into effect4 while the case was in the lower courts and had 
been in effect for five years when the supreme court made its 
decision. 
The supreme court found constitutional the Act's require- 
ments of personal injury and property damage protection. The 
Act's requirement of residual liability insurance and the exclu- 
sion from coverage of two-wheeled motor vehicles were also 
judged constitutional. The supreme court remanded the issues 
concerning the constitutionality of the Act's work-loss and re- 
placement services reimbursement schemes and its provisions 
concerning nonresident motorists for further evidentiary develop- 
ment. 
Despite the court's finding that compulsory no-fault insur- 
1. Michigan no-fault ruling endangers federal bill, 64 A.B.A.J. 955 (1978); 21 ATLA L. 
REFJ. 242 (1978); 47 U.S.L.W. 2088 (1978). 
2. 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). 
3. MICH. COW. LAWS ANN. 8 500.3101-.3179 (West Supp. 1979-1980). 
4. The No-Fault Act became effective on October 1, 1973. MICH. COW. LAWS ANN. § 
500.3101 (West Supp. 1979-1980). 
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ance could constitutionally be required, the court held that "the 
actual mechanisms for protecting the welfare of individual Michi- 
gan motorists, required by law to purchase no-fault insurance, are 
constitutionally deficient in failing to provide due pro~ess."~ Spe- 
cifically, the court found the Act to be deficient for failure to 
protect against "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discrimina- 
tory" rates, and failure to establish procedures whereby motorists 
could challenge individual rating decisions. The Act also failed to 
provide procedures enabling motorists to challenge refusal or can- 
cellation of insurance, or consignment to the "Automobile Place- 
ment Facility," an assigned risk plan.' In examining the regula- 
tory scheme, the court considered not only the No-Fault Act it- 
seif, but also other provisions of the Michigan Insurance Code 
dealing with rates and ratemaking.' 
A. Due Bocess Challenges to State No-Fault Plans 
Many arguments based on the right to due process of law 
have been unsuccessfully advanced in challenges to state no-fault 
plans.8 The most common due process arguments focus on the 
5. 402 Mich. a t  580, 267 N.W. 2d at  77 (emphasis deleted). 
6. Id., 267 N.W.2d at  78. An "assigned risk" plan is a method whereby drivers who 
cannot obtain insurance through normal methods, because their applications for insur- 
ance have been denied or their insurance policies have been cancelled, are assigned to 
insurers by a method of rotation or proration. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTEC- 
TION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 569-70 (1965). 
7. 402 Mich. a t  600-03, 267 N.W.2d at 87-88. 
8. Many challenges to state no-fault plans have been advanced on grounds other than 
due process. See, e.g., Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal 
dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976) (right to trial by jury, unconstitutional abolition of a 
common law right of action, equal protection, fifth amendment protection against self- 
incrimination); Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (right to travel 
fieely, right to trial by jury, right of access to the courts, collateral source rule, equal 
protection, nonresident motorist provision); Andrews v. State, 238 Ga. 433,233 S.E.2d 209 
(1977) (equal protection, first amendment freedom of religion); Manzanares v. Bell, 214 
Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974) (right to travel freely, right to trial by jury, unconstitu- 
tional abolition of a common law right of action, vagueness and overbreadth, equal protec- 
tion, criminal sanctions an unlawful delegation of legislative power, nonresident motorist 
provision); Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975) (right to trial by jury, right of 
access to the courts, unconstitutional abolition of a common law right of action, collateral 
source rule, equal protection, state constitutional provision prohibiting special legislation 
when general legislation is appropriate, nonresident motorist provision); Pinnick v. 
Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971) (right to trial by jury, right of access to the 
courts, unconstitutional abolition of a common law right of action, collateral source rule, 
vagueness and overbreadth, equal protection, separation of powers); Opinion of the Jus- 
tices, 113 N.H. 205,304 A.2d 881 (1973) (right to trial by jury, right of access to the courts, 
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scheme's perceived deprivation of property, the requirement of 
mandatory insurance, and the provisions allowing a policyholder 
to determine some rights on behalf of his or her household, minor 
child, or legally incapacitated ward.' 
Two state court decisions have examined the key issue in 
Shauers-the constitutionality of the regulatory scheme that 
implements a particular no-fault plan. In Pinnick v. Cleary,l0 the 
first case to consider a challenge to a state no-fault automobile 
equal protection); Rybeck v. Rybeck, 141 N.J. Super. 481, 358 A.2d 828 (1976) (right to 
trial by jury, right of access to the courts, equal protection, unconstitutional limitation of 
damages); Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444,378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975) 
(right to trial by jury, unconstitutional abolition of a common law right of action, vague- 
ness and overbreadth, equal protection); Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 
(1975) (unconstitutional limitation of damages). 
Successful challenges to state no-fault plans on grounds other than due process have 
been made in Florida, Illinois, New Hamsphire, and Michigan. The Florida Supreme 
Court determined that a provision allowing victims who received an injury involving 
fracture to a weight-bearing bone to sue in tort, though their expenses did not exceed the 
$10,000 threshold, while those with soft-tissue injuries had to meet the threshold, created 
an unreasonable and arbitrary classification in denial of equal protection. Lasky v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). The Florida court had previously found that a 
provision abolishing tort recovery for property damage less than $550 deprived plaintiffs 
of access to the courts. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). 
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478,283 N.E.2d 474 (1972), 
ruled that classification of victims based on the type of vehicle that caused their injury 
violated a state constitutional provision requiring a general law instead of a special law, 
if possible, and denied recovery on an arbitrary basis. In addition, the Illinois court found 
that the no-fault plan's compulsory arbitration provisions violated a state constitutional 
mandate that there be no fee officers in the judicial system, and denied plaintiffs trial by 
jury. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court also found fault with a compulsory arbitration 
plan in an advisory opinion regarding the constitutionality of the state's no-fault legisla- 
tion. Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 304 A.2d 881 (1973). The court held that the 
legislature could not constitutionally impose arbitration on cases involving less than $3000 
or require payment of arbitration costs as a condition precedent to appeal. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the provision requiring reduction of no- 
fault benefits by amounts payable under state or federal law violated equal protection by 
discriminating against those with no private insurance in addition to no-fault coverage. 
The court implied that a rule requiring the offset of no-fault benefits only by amounts 
received as workmen's compensation would survive judicial scrutiny. O'Donnell v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 70 Mich. App. 487, 245 N.W.2d 801 (1976). 
See Siedel, The Constitutionality of No-Fault Insurance: The Courts Speak, 26 DRAKE 
L. REV. 794 (1976-1977). 
9. See, e.g., Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 
423 US .  1041 (1976); Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Andrew v. 
State, 238 Ga. 433, 233 S.E,2d 209 (1977); Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 
1291 (1974); Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 
1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971); Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 304 A.2d 881 (1973); 
Rybeck v. Rybeck, 141 N.J. Super. 481, 358 A.2d 828 (1976); Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 
N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975). See Siedel, supra note 8, at 800-03. 
10. 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). 
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insurance plan, the plaintiff argued that he was forced to insure 
himself through a "private, profit-making corporation," in viola- 
tion of due process. The Massachusetts Supreme Court disa- 
greed, ruling inter alia that state regulation of automobile insur- 
ers protected plaintiff's rights. In rejecting plaintiff's argument 
that the ratemaking scheme violated due process, the court em- 
phasized that the state commissioner of insurance set the rates 
and that the law provided a review of the rates to any aggrieved 
party. l1 
In Gentile u. Altermatt12 the plaintiffs challenged the reason- 
ableness of the underwriting guidelines used by the insurers. The 
Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that the state's no-fault 
statute adequately protected plaintiffs' rights to be free of arbi- 
trary, unreasonable, or discriminatory insurance rates. The court 
determined that the availability of administrative and judicial 
review of rates and policies at the request of an aggrieved insured 
and the presence of the state insurance commissioner on the gov- 
erning board of the Connecticut automobile insurance plan ade- 
quately guaranteed the availability of insurance at  reasonable 
rates.13 
Although the Massachusetts and Connecticut courts briefly 
considered challenges to their state no-fault regulatory schemes, 
they did not discuss the basis of the insureds' due process right 
to reasonable rates and procedures. Nor did the courts explain 
how individuals may come to be entitled to expect such reasona- 
bleness on the part of the private insurance companies with 
whom they deal. That entitlement was the basis for the Michigan 
court's decision in Shavers v. Attorney General. 
B. Other Compulsory Insurance Plans 
A workable no-fault insurance plan is necessarily compul- 
sory,14 and many due process problems that arise in connection 
with no-fault insurance are due to its compulsory nature. Thus, 
they are potential problems in any system of compulsory insur- 
ance. However, due process challenges to compulsory insurance 
have usually failed in the courts. 
Motor vehicle insurance is probably the oldest form of com- 
11. Id. at 24-25, 271 N.E.2d at 607-08. See Siedel, supra note 8, at 800-03. 
12. 169 Conn. 167, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). 
13. Id. at 291-92, 363 A.2d at 19-20. See Siedel, supra note 8, at 800-03. 
14. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 341-43. 
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pulsory insurance in the United States. Commercial vehicles were 
required to carry liability insurance as early as 1914.15 In 1927 
Massachusetts became the first state to mandate liability insur- 
ance for private automobiles.lWther states followed,I7 though the 
majority of states have never had compulsory automobile liability 
insurance laws. All states have enacted some form of financial 
responsibility law with respect to  motorist^.^^ 
Although the validity of compulsory automobile liability in- 
surance laws has been questioned in the courts, they have been 
sustained as proper exercises of state police power.lg The United 
States Supreme Court has refused to interfere with such state 
findings of constit~tionality.~~ Due process challenges to the regu- 
latory schemes have failed.21 
A much more recent type of compulsory insurance is profes- 
sional liability insurance, most commonly medical malpractice 
insurance. A Louisiana challenge to hospital-required medical 
malpractice insurance on due process grounds was dismissed be- 
cause the court found that the plaintiff had no liberty or property 
interest sufficient to invoke due process  protection^.^^ Idaho's 
state-mandated medical malpractice insurance was also upheld." 
Although the Idaho court felt that due process protections were 
applicable, the court held that the state's police power allowed 
the compulsory insurance. The Supreme Court denied certior- 
ari. 24 
15. Comment, Compulsory Liability Insurance for Commercial Motor Vehicles, 3 
LAW & CONTEMP. ROB. 571 (1936). 
16. R. KEETON & J .  O'CONNELL, Supra note 6, at 76. 
17. New York and North Carolina enacted compulsory automobile liability insurance 
laws in 1956 and 1957, respectively. Id. 
18. Note, The South Carolina Automobile Reparation Reform Act (Part XI): Compul- 
sory Insurance-A Synopsis and Appraisal, 27 S.C.L. REV. 919, 921 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as Compulsory Insurance]. Financial responsibility laws may not mandate insur- 
ance coverage or an indication of financial solvency until a motorist has been involved in 
an accident or has been shown unable to satisfy an adverse judgment. Id. at 922-24. 
19. E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681 (1925). 
20. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). 
21. R. KEETON & J. 07C0N~~LL, SUPM note 6, a t  86-102. 
22. Pollock v. Methodist Hosp., 392 F. Supp. 393, 396 (E.D. La. 1975). 
23. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 
431 U.S. 914 (1977). 
24. 431 U.S. 914 (1977). Despite the reasoning of the Idaho ruling, similar Kentucky 
legislation was invalidated as an unjustified exercise of state police power. McGuffey v. 
Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977). For an examination of the constitutionality of compul- 
sory medical malpractice insurance statutes on substantive due process and equal protec- 
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Compulsory legal malpractice insurance is less common than 
medical malpractice insurance, but it has been enacted in Bri- 
tish Columbia, Norway, and Oregon, and seriously considered in 
Washington and C a l i f ~ r n i a . ~ ~  As with medical malpractice insur- 
ance, due process claims challenging the constitutionality of legal 
malpractice insurance regulatory schemes have not been success- 
ful. 
One successful challenge to the regulatory scheme of a com- 
pulsory insurance plan occurred in Pennsylvania Coal Mining 
Association v. Insurance Department. " Pennsylvania coal mining 
companies were required by statute to self-insure or purchase 
black lung insurance coverage as a condition of doing business. 
They challenged a rate increase that went into effect without 
prior notice or hearing, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
agreed that the coal companies had been denied due process of 
law because of lack of notice and opportunity to voice objec- 
t i o n ~ . ~ '  The court's decision, like that in Shavers, was based on 
the entitlement doctrine. 
C. The Entitlement Doctrine 
The entitlement doctrine stems from the requirement that a 
person claiming a violation of due process must establish that a 
protected interest has been encroached by the state? In Board , 
of Regents v. R ~ t h , ~ ~  for example, Roth, a state university assist- 
ant professor, was hired for one year and then informed that he 
would not be rehired. Roth argued that due process required that 
he receive notice of the reasons he was not rehired and an oppor- 
tunity for a hearing.30 The Supreme Court held that the decision 
not to rehire did not infringe any significant liberty or property 
interests protected by the due process clause." The terms of 
tion grounds, see Muranaka, Compulsory Medical Malpractice Insurance Statutes: An 
Approach in Determining Constitutionality, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 599 (1978). 
25. Comment, Should Legal Malpractice Insurance Be Mandatory?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 102, 112-18. For an argument in support of the plans enacted in Oregon and consid- 
ered in California, see Boyer, Legal Malpractice and Compulsory Client Protection, 29 
HASTINGS L.J. 835 (1978). 
26. 471 Pa. 437, 370 A.2d 685 (1977). 
27. Id. at  443, 370 A.2d at  692. 
28. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Comment, 
Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Rocess of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89, 94-95 [hereinafter 
cited as Entitlement and Due Process]. 
29. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
30. Id. a t  569. 
31. Id. a t  575, 578. 
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Roth's appointment did not create any "legitimate claim of enti- 
tlement" to reemployment, nor did any state statute or university 
policy create such an entitlement.32 
Conversely, a minister deprived of his driver's license with- 
out a hearing was held entitled to greater protection in Bell u. 
BursonY The Supreme Court determined that the minister's li- 
cense represented important interests, in part connected with his 
pursuit of a livelihood, which gave rise to the protections of proce- 
dural due process.34 
The standards for determining the presence of an entitle- 
ment have not been specifically defined by the Supreme C ~ u r t . ' ~  
It seems clear, however, that the person seeking to establish a 
protected property interest in a benefit must have "more than an 
abstract need or desire for" or "unilateral expectation of '  the 
benefit in q~est ion.~Wn action by the state, whether it takes the 
form of a statute, policy, or understanding, is necessary to create 
the entitlement.37 Some courts have emphasized the fact that the 
benefited person has relied on the entitlement received.38 
In Pennsylvania Coal Mining Association, in which the regu- 
latory scheme of a compulsory insurance plan was successfully 
challenged on due process grounds,39 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court found the compulsory nature of the insurance, its connec- 
tion to the pursuit of a livelihood, and the "dependency and 
reliance" created by the regulatory scheme crucial to its result. 
We conclude that the requirement that the coal mining compa- 
nies purchase insurance, the importance of the insurance rates 
to their ability to remain in business, and the purposes of regula- 
tion by the Insurance Department create the combination of 
dependency and reliance which makes applicable the protec- 
tions of procedural due process.40 
32. Id. at 577-78. 
33. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
34. Id. at 539. 
35. Shavers v. Attorney Gen., 402 Mich. at 646-47, 267 N.W.2d at 110 (Ryan, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
36. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
37. Id. at 578; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972); Entitlement and 
Due Process, supra note 28, at 98. 
38. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. 
Insurance Dep't, 471 Pa. at 447-49, 370 A.2d at 690. 
39. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra. 
40. 471 Pa. at 449, 370 A.2d at 691. 
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One requirement articulated in connection with the entitle- 
ment doctrine, but not mentioned in the Pennsylvania Coal Min- 
ing Association case, is that of "present enjoyment": the person 
must already possess the benefit in question and be threatened 
with its deprivation. If a person is simply seeking to acquire a 
benefit, there is no present en j~ymen t .~~  
The present enjoyment requirement, which draws a distinc- 
tion between the due process protection of rights already received 
and benefits not yet conferred, has been critici~ed.'~ In connection 
with Bell v. B u r ~ o n , ~ ~  in which the Supreme Court stressed that 
procedural due process protections attach only after a driver's 
license is one commentator has pointed out: 
The Court correctly emphasized the importance of the right to 
operate an automobile in modern society. But how is it that only 
"[olnce licenses are issued" that they become "essential in the 
pursuit of a livelihood"? Clearly, the need for a license as an 
important concomitant of a full and active life is not necessarily 
any different for an initial applicant than for a license holder 
who is threatened with revocation  proceeding^.^^ 
Thus, three factors must be considered in determining 
whether a party has a protected interest in a state-administered 
benefit, as the entitlement doctrine is currently appliedAR: first, 
there must be a legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefit 
based on some form of state action; second, the party must rely 
on the benefit; and third, the party must presently enjoy the 
benefit. 
Justice Williams, writing for the court in Shavers v. Attorney 
General, characterized the critical issue as whether the present 
regulatory scheme for compulsory no-fault insurance gave motor- 
ists due process protection with regard to the fairness of insurance 
41. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 US. at 
576; Entitlement and Due Process, supra note 28, at 101-02. 
42. Entitlement and Due Process, supra note 28, at 111-14. 
43. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
44. Id. at 539. 
45. Entitlement and Due Process, supra note 28, at 112 (footnote omitted). 
46. For a criticism of the current application of the entitlement doctrine and a pro- 
posed model of procedural due process, see Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: 
Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Botection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 
(1978). 
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rates and the proper availability of insurance.47 He then discussed 
two requirements that must be satisfied before the due process 
clause can be invoked: first, there must be state action; second, 
the allegedly deprived right must fall within the protected areas 
of "life, liberty, or property."48 
The Michigan court determined that the actions of the insur- 
ance companies in the context of the No-Fault Act did constitute 
state action. Noting that the Act compels no-fault insurance at  
the risk of civil and criminal penalities, and that it details the 
extent of coverage, conditions of payment, and assignment of 
claims and risks, the court found that the "insurance companies 
are the instruments through which the Legislature carries out a 
scheme of general welfare."4Q Distinguishing the insufficient in- 
terest in utility rates held by customers attempting to invoke due 
process," the court concluded that since the Michigan legislation 
went "beyond a grant of a monopoly or an attempt to regulate a 
the actions of the insurance companies were, in effect, 
the actions of the state. 
The question of the relationship between fair rates and pro- 
cedures and the due process clause was more difficult to address. 
The issue facing the court was whether the plaintiffs had a pro- 
tected property interest, under the entitlement doctrine, in the 
benefit conferred by the state. The court articulated the test it 
applied: "The existence of interests or benefits entitled to due 
process protection depends on the extent to which government 
activity has fostered citizen dependency and reliance on the ac- 
tivity. "52 
The court found that the government had fostered extensive 
citizen reliance on fairly administered no-fault insurance. Noting 
that the mobility provided by a car is a practical necessity in the 
day-to-day lives of most Michigan residents, Justice Williams 
compared compulsory no-fault insurance to a driver's license. A 
driver's license, once issued, represents an interest subject to due 
process  protection^.^^ A driver's license is of little use unless the 
licensee is allowed to register and operate a motor vehicle. There- 
402 Mich. at 594-95, 267 N.W.2d at 85. 
Id. at 597-98, 267 N.W.2d at 86. 
Id. at 597, 267 N.W.2d at 86. 
Id. (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 US. 345, 351 (1974)). 
Id. 
Id. at 598, 267 N.W.2d at 86 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). 
Bell v. Burson, 402 US. at 539. 
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fore, according to the court, the interest in registering and operat- 
ing a motor vehicle is subject to due process protections. Because 
one cannot register or operate a motor vehicle in Michigan with- 
out no-fault insurance, the interest in fairly administered no-fault 
insurance is subject to due process  protection^.^" 
The court further concluded that  the legislature had 
"fostered the expectation that no-fault insurance will be avail- 
able a t  fair and equitable rates,"55 quoting sections of the Michi- 
gan Insurance Code which state that "[rlates shall not be exces- 
sive, inadequate or unfairly dis~riminatory"~~ and that no-fault 
insurance coverage "will be available to any person who is unable 
to procure insurance through ordinary methods."57 
The court determined that the No-Fault Act, as adminis- 
tered, did not satisfy due process requirements. Motorists could 
be refused insurance, have their insurance cancelled, or be as- 
signed to the Automobile Placement Facility without effective 
legal procedures available to challenge the action. In addition, 
the rates proposed by the insurance companies and approved by 
the state's insurance commissioner could not be challenged until 
after they had become effective. That rule forced insured motor- 
ists to pay rates, even if they thought the rates unfair, while they 
challenged them. Also, motorists assigned to the Automobile 
Placement Facility did not have the same coverage options that 
were available to other  motorist^.^^ 
Having determined that the present administrative scheme 
did not satisfy the requirements of due process, the court pro- 
ceeded to outline the standards for a law that would satisfy due 
process.59 I t  was not enough that the legislature required fair pro- 
cedures and then left the major determination of the procedures 
to private insurance companies. The legislature or the insurance 
commissioner must make sufficiently definite rules in order to 
raise the legislative mandate of fair rates and procedures above 
the level of e x h o r t a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The court, however, did allow eighteen 
months, during which the No-Fault Act would remain in effect, 
402 Mich. at 599, 267 N.W.2d at 87. 
Id. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $ 500.2403(1)(d) (West Supp. 1979-1980). 
Id. 5 500.3301(1)(a). 
402 Mich. at 601-05, 267 N.W.2d at 88-90. 
Id. at 607-08, 267 N.W.2d at 91. 
Id. at 601-02, 267 N.W.2d at 88. 
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for the legislature and insurance commissioner to take corrective 
action.61 
Three of the seven justices wrote separate opinions, concur- 
ring in part and dissenting in part. All three dissenting justices 
criticized the majority for deciding the due process issue, which 
was not raised as an issue on appeal.62 The dissenters felt that the 
majority's justification for deciding the issue-the majority 
stated that  they felt "compelled to address [the due process 
issue] because of its basic, threshold importance to any decision 
[they] might render as to the No-Fault Act's con~titutionality"~ 
and that "[alfter five years of uncertainty as to the constitution- 
ality of the No-Fault Act, [they] believe the people of the State 
of Michigan deserve an opinion which addresses this crucial con- 
stitutional challenge to the No-Fault Act's regulatory scheme 
head onMB4-was an unsatisfactory basis for the exercise of judi- 
cial review. 
Although the dissent contended that there was no factual 
record to show that Michigan motorists were unable to obtain 
insurance a t  fair rates,s5 the court did have access to a report to 
the Governor on "Essential Insurance in Michigan."" That docu- 
ment disclosed deficiencies in the Michigan automobile and 
homeowners' insurance systems. The report found that the auto- 
mobile insurance system failed to guarantee that essential insur- 
ance would be available to consumers meeting minimum stan- 
dards of in~urability.~' The system also failed to guarantee com- 
petitive, fair prices or to guarantee the consumer freedom of 
choice of companies, coverage, and prices? Nor was the system 
found to be cost effective. Practices of the insurance industry, 
perhaps justified by the status of insurance companies as private 
economic  enterprise^,^^ were found to be based on subjective f'ac- 
- 
61. Id. at 581, 267 N.W.2d at 78. 
62. Id. at 641-43, 267 N.W.2d at 107-08 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part); id. at 667-68, 267 N.W.2d at 118-19 (Fitzgerald, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part); id. at 670, 267 N.W.2d at 120 (Coleman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part); 
63. Id. at 593n.14, 267N.W.2dat84n.14. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 646, 267 N.W.2d at 109 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
66. INSURANCE BUREAU, MICH. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ESSENTIAL INSURANCE IN MICHIGAN 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as ESSENTIAL ~ S U R A N C E ] .  
67. Id. at 33, 37. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 9. 
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tors that could not be objectively defended.'" Because Michigan 
automobile insurance is compulsory, the report considered the 
resulting inequities int~lerable.'~ The insurance commissioner's 
report to the Governor was cited twice by the majority7z and once 
by the dissent73 and may have replaced the missing "factual re- 
cord. " 
Only Justice Ryan's separate opinion directly confronted the 
majority's use of the entitlement doctrine and what Justice Ryan 
saw as a mistaken application of the doctrine to the facts of the 
case. He found no constitutionally protected interest in fair insur- 
ance rates,74 nor did he find any statutory provision that created 
an entitlement to such pro te~t ion .~~ He concluded that the major- 
ity overlooked the requirement of present enjoyment of the pro- 
tected property interests, an important aspect of the entitlement 
d~ctrine.~"xplaining that only potential unfairness had been 
adjudicated by the majority, Justice Ryan stated that the actions 
of the court constituted a usurpation of the legislative function.?? 
If the Michigan court was correct in finding a protected due 
process interest in fair rates and procedures for no-fault insur- 
ance, then, according to the court's standards, citizens would be 
entitled to administrative review of the basis for refusal or cancel- 
lation of ins~rance.'~ The resulting burdens on state regulatory 
agencies and insurance companies, and the resulting boon to in- 
sured or potentially insured parties, require a careful evaluation 
of the court's reasoning. 
- 
70. Id. a t  26. 
71. Id. a t  9. The industry practices found to limit the fair availability of insurance 
to Michigan consumers were whimsical, inconsistent underwriting and cancellation prac- 
tices that forced undeserving consumers into the assigned risk category, id. a t  10-11, 25- 
26; see Compulsory Insurance, supra note 18, a t  932-33, and the practice of charging 
premiums based on invalid classifications, thus creating wide ranges in premiums charged 
for objectively similar risks, id. a t  11-12, 24-25. 
72. 402 Mich. a t  602 n.25, 605 n.28, 267 N.W.2d at  88 n.25, 90 n.28. 
73. Id. a t  668 n.3, 267 N.W.2d a t  119 n.3 (Fitzgerald J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
74. Id. a t  651, 267 N.W.2d at  112 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
75. Id. a t  653-54, 267 N.W.2d a t  113. 
76. Id. a t  650, 267 N.W.2d at  111. 
77. Id. a t  657, 267 N.W.2d at  114. 
78. Id. a t  608, 267 N.W.2d a t  91. 
CASENOTE 
A. The Court's Use of the Entitlement Doctrine 
I .  The basis for the entitlement in state action 
The majority found a claim of right to fair insurance rates 
and procedures under Michigan law in the statutory mandate 
that "[rlates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly dis- 
criminatory," and in the Insurance Code provision that guaran- 
tees the availability of no-fault c~verage.'~ Justice Ryan's dissent 
stressed that a statute creating an entitlement must specifically 
define the conditions under which the benefit in question may be 
granted or deniedmBO An examination of the authorities cited in 
support of that proposition reveals, however, that although such 
specific statutes were being adjudicated in the cited cases, there 
is no holding that such specificity is a requirement under the 
entitlement do~trine.~' 
Justice Ryan explained one of the provisions in which the 
majority found a claim of right as a mere standard for the insurers 
and insurance commissioner to However, the majority is 
probably correct in its holding that "[tlhe Legislature has . . . 
fostered the expectation that no-fault insurance will be available 
a t  fair and equitable rates."" The compulsory nature of the insur- 
ance appears to elevate that expectation to the status of a right 
under state law.84 
2. Reliance on the benefit 
The majority emphasized that a person relies on the 
"independent mobility provided by an automobile" as a "crucial, 
practical neces~ity."~~ Although the dissent explained that "the 
element of citizen reliance standing alone is not sufficient to cre- 
ate the entitlement interest to which due process protections at- 
tach,"86 the element of reliance does seem to be a factor in sup- 
79. Id. a t  599, 267 N.W.2d at  87 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § §  500.2403(1)(d), 
.3301(l)(a)). 
80. Id. a t  647, 267 N.W.2d at  110 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
81. Id. at  647 n.6, 267 N.W.2d a t  110 n.6 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U S .  134 
(1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). See also Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n 
v. Insurance Dep't, 471 Pa. a t  447-49, 370 A.2d at  690. 
82. 402 Mich. a t  654, 267 N.W.2d at  113 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
83. Id. at  599, 267 N.W.2d at  87. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. a t  598, 267 N.W.2d a t  87. 
86. Id. a t  648, 267 N.W.2d a t  110 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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porting a claim of entitlement." It shows that the claimant may 
be one of those "helpless . . . persons who are in a dependent 
relationship to government with respect to basic needs."TI'he 
ability to operate one's car, once the right to do so has been 
obtained through the issuance of a driver's license, may become 
such a basic need, as has been suggested by the Supreme Court 
in Bell v .  Burson: "Once licenses are issued, . . . their continued 
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a liveliho~d."~~ 
3. Present enjoyment 
Despite satisfaction of the entitlement doctrine's require- 
ments of state action and reliance on the benefit, the majority's 
argument ignored the present enjoyment requirement. Its finding 
of a protected interest stemmed from the holding in Bell v .  
Burson. The Michigan court argued that a driver's license is of 
little use unless the licensee can register and operate a motor 
vehicle. Therefore, the interest in registering and operating a 
motor vehicle is as significant as the interest in the use of a 
driver's license. Because no-fault insurance is required in order to 
register and operate a motor vehicle, the court reasoned, there 
must be a protected interest in obtaining the compulsory insur- 
ance a t  fair rates and in being fairly treated by the insurance 
companies. 
While the court's analysis makes sense as a logical syllogism, 
it wreaks havoc with the requirement of present enjoyment. The 
dissent in Shavers made a strong argument that satisfaction of 
the present enjoyment requirement is e~sent ia l .~~  The dissent 
pointed out: 
An individual does not possess, in the abstract, a property 
interest in the operation of his vehicle upon Michigan's high- 
ways. Rather, the property interest lies in his status as a regis- 
trant or licensee recipient of the entitled benefit. Until an indi- 
vidual acquires such licensure or proves his eligibility for it, he 
does not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Essen- 
- 
87. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra. 
88. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L W 515-16 (1978). 
89. 402 U.S. at 539. 
90. Id. at 599, 267 N.W.2d at 87. 
91. Id. at 650-51, 267 N.W.2d at 111 (Ryan, J.,  concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 539; Scarpa 
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 1973)). See also Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 708-10 (1976). 
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tially, the requirement of no-fault insurance simply conditions 
or defines one aspect of the eligibility for the benefit. Until an 
individual fulfills the eligibility requirement of obtaining no- 
fault insurance, he does not have a valid claim of entitlement 
to operate his vehicle in M i ~ h i g a n . ~ ~  
The concept of entitlement could be applied to those who 
already possess no-fault insurance, allowing the majority's due 
process requirements concerning (1) fair rates once insurance is 
obtained, (2) cancellation, or (3) reassignment to the Automobile 
Placement F a ~ i l i t y . ~ ~  Nevertheless, under the entitlement doc- 
trine, the requirement of present enjoyment would forestall the 
court's grant of due process protection in terms of initial (1) rates, 
(2) refusal, or (3) assignment to the Automobile Placement Facil- 
ity?* 
The requirement of present enjoyment under the entitlement 
doctrine does serve an ascertainable purpose. The courts seem 
unwilling to allow every person who applies for a government- 
granted benefit to enjoy due process protections if the benefit is 
refused. The endless numbers of hearings necessary for those de- 
nied noncommercial hunting and fishing licenses, parade per- 
mits, bonfire permits, and the like undoubtedly loom large in the 
minds of those who must apply the entitlement doctrine. Never- 
theless, the appropriate line to draw is not always between those 
who presently enjoy government-granted benefits and those who 
do not. Such a distinction is unnecessarily artificialB5 and encour- 
ages those who grant benefits to be more selective in their deci- 
sions to accept ap,plications, since once a benefit is granted it will 
be difficult to revoke.B6 
Despite the fact that the application of the present enjoy- 
ment doctrine may be appropriate in some cases, the majority in 
Shavers was justified in ignoring the doctrine. The appropriate 
distinction in the instant case should not be based upon the dif- 
ference between those who have already acquired no-fault insur- 
ance and those who have not. The benefit is as important to a 
person who needs it, but has not yet acquired it, as it is to a 
person who has acquired the benefit. The crucial issue is the 
402 Mich. a t  651, 267 N.W.2d at  112 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
gee id. at  605-08, 267 N.W.2d a t  90-91. 
See id. 
See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra. 
Entitlement and Due Process, supra note 28, at  116-17. 
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compulsory nature of the insurance, not as a benefit, but-as a 
government-administered requirement necessary to an important 
part of normal adult life and the pursuit of a l ivelih~od.~~ 
B. The Uniqueness of Compulsory Insurance 
The problems of the Michigan law addressed by the court in 
Shavers were the lack of procedures to challenge allegedly arbi- 
trary and discriminatory refusal and cancellation practices or 
placement in the assigned risk category, and the lack of guaran- 
teed fair rates and a variety of coverage options in the assigned 
risk category.98 Such problems are not unique to no-fault insur- 
ance. They are potential problems in any system of compulsory 
or essential insurance? The problems recognized by the court do 
not result because the insurance is of the no-fault type; they are 
due to its compulsory nature. If a state relies on private insurance 
companies to provide compulsory insurance to its citizens, then 
the state must require fair dealing on the part of those profit- 
seeking organizations, and legislate the procedures to ensure such 
fair dealing. The grant of a virtual monopoly to a private industry 
exempt from federal antitrust regulationloo in an area so intri- 
cately linked with an individual's personal freedom and pursuit 
of a livelihood requires a state vigilance that transcends the re- 
quirements of the entitlement doctrine. Though such protection 
would ideally stem from legislative action, the courts have a re- 
sponsibility to protect the rights of individuals in this area, since 
individuals do not possess the lobbying power enjoyed by the 
insurance companies. 
C. Remedial Legislation Proposed to the Michigan Legislature 
As of July 1979 four bills dealing with concerns raised by the 
Michigan court's decision in Shavers v. Attorney General were 
being considered by the Michigan Legislature. Each house of the 
legislature was considering two bills relevant to the Shavers deci- 
sion. 
- -- 
97. One commentator suggests a balancing approach. Id. a t  118-22. 
98. 402 Mich. a t  604-05, 267 N.W.2d at  89-90. 
99. For example, such problems with homeowners' insurance are discussed generally 
in ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 66. 
100. 15 U.S.C.A. $ 1012 (1976). 
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1. Bills being considered in the Michigan House of 
Representatives 
Two bills proposed to the Michigan House of Representatives 
were still in the Committee on Insurance in July 1979. One of 
them, H. 4650,1°1 provides that "for the purpose of rating automo- 
bile insurance based upon groupings of insureds or insured auto- 
mobiles using territorial or locational criteria, a territory shall not 
be smaller than the entire state."lo2 The bill appears to be di- 
rected at avoiding unfairly discriminatory rates, in keeping with 
the minimum requirements of the Shavers court. 
H. 44531°4 involves more extensive reform of Michigan's in- 
surance system. It creates a "Michigan Indemnity Association" 
to guarantee availability of essential motor vehicle and home 
insurance to Michigan consumers.105 The indemnity association is 
a reinsurance facility,lo6 and does away with the need for the 
Automobile Placement Facility assigned risk plan.Iu7 The in- 
demnity association, by allowing insureds to choose the agent, 
company, and coverage they want, successfully addresses the 
Shavers court's concerns about the variety of coverage options in 
the residual market.lo8 The bill does not provide an opportunity 
for the insured to challenge his or her placement in the residual 
market. However, the limitation on rates charged to high risks 
ceded to the indemnity association, the careful definition of "high 
risk,"lM and the limitation on the number of policies an insurer 
may cede to the asso~iationl~~ may satisfy the demands of due 
process. 
The bill also forbids ratemaking decisions for essential insur- 
ance based on sex, marital status, age, residence, or location of 
101. H. 4650, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. (1979). 
102. Id. § 2405. 
103. See 402 Mich. at  607, 267 N.W.2d at  91. 
104. H. 4453, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. (1979). 
105. Id. § 2103. 
106. Id. 8 2105. A reinsurance facility, in the context of motor vehicle insurance, 
allows drivers to choose the agent and company from which they want coverage. Compa- 
nies not wishing to insure certain risks reinsure them through a-central pool, and con- 
nected losses are shared on a proportionate basis by all insurance companies writing motor 
vehicle insurance. Compulsory Insurance, supra note 18, a t  934 n.70. See H. 4453, 80th 
Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. $ §  2104, 2120 (1979). 
107. H. 4453, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. 8 2122 (1979). 
108. See 402 Mich. at  607-08, 267 N.W.2d at  89-90. 
109. H. 4453, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. $ 2105A (1979). 
110. Id. 8 2105. 
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the risk, and allows the insurance commissioner to make rules to 
implement the restrictions.ll1 That provision appears to respond 
to the Shavers court's instruction that the legislature give mean- 
ing to the prohibition of discriminatory rates.l12 In addition, the 
bill strikes the provision that allowed rating classifications based 
on differences among risks that might have a probable effect on 
losses and expenses, a provision that allowed rates to be estab- 
lished on "insubstantial bases which do not satisfy due pro- 
cess."l13 
H. 4453 does not, however, address some important concerns 
of the Shavers court. While it does provide for administrative 
review of rates that are already in effect,l14 it does not provide 
opportunity for an aggrieved party to complain before the rates 
become effective. This condition was considered a denial of due 
process by the Shavers court.l15 The bill also fails to require that 
filings and supportive information be available to the public be- 
fore the rates take effect. This condition was considered to be 
"questionable due process" by the Shavers court .IL6 
H. 4453 does require agents to furnish potential insureds with 
"a representative set of quotations of premiums at which compa- 
nies represented by the agent will issue policies for essential in- 
~ u r a n c e . " ~ ~ ~  It also sets out factors to be considered when deter- 
mining rates? However, it does not explicitly provide that the 
factors used to determine premiums be publicized so that an 
individual may calculate his probable premiums, a requirement 
of minimum due process according to the Shavers court.llY 
Thus, while H. 4453 would be a progressive step toward as- 
suring due process to consumers of no-fault insurance in Michi- 
gan, it is not completely in harmony with the requirements of the 
Shavers court. 
2. Bills being considered i n  the Michigan Senate 
As of July 1979 the two automobile insurance bills being 
pp - - 
111. Id. $ 2106(2). 
112. See 402 Mich. a t  607, 267 N.W.2d at 91. 
113. Id. at  602, 267 N.W.2d at  88 (footnote omitted). 
114. H. 4453, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. $ 2106(3) (1979). 
115. 402 Mich. a t  602-03, 267 N.W.2d at  88-89. 
116. Id. at  602, 267 N.W.2d at  88. 
117. H. 4453, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. $ 2120(A) (1979). 
118. Id. $ $  2108, 2403. 
119. 402 Mich. a t  608, 267 N.W.2d at 91. 
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considered by the Michigan Senate were in the Committee on 
Commerce. S. 127120 adds a section to the Michigan Insurance 
Code requiring agents whose contract with an insurer is cancelled 
to inform insured parties that they may be able to continue cover- 
age with the same insurer through another agent.I2l The bill does 
not deal solely with essential insurance, but it would prevent 
some cases of inadvertent or unfair policy nonrenewal. 
S. 243122 directly addresses the concerns of the Michigan Su- 
preme Court, as explained in Shavers. The bill moves "residence" 
and "location of the risk" from a list of factors that could be 
considered if reasonably related to the extent of risk or coverage, 
to a list of factors that may not be considered in refusing cover- 
age.123 The bill also disallows refusal of coverage because the ap- 
plicant was formerly an "assigned risk."124 These changes in the 
law are responsive to the Michigan court's concern that insurance 
be fairly available to consumers, as the legislature guaranteed.lZ5 
The proposed legislation also clarifies the meaning of the 
provision prohibiting "unfairly discriminatory" rates, 126 pursuant 
to the Shavers court's minimum due process requirements. 127 Also 
in keeping with the court's requirements, the bill includes provi- 
sions specifying the supportive information to be included with 
rate filings128 and requiring that rate filings and supportive infor- 
mation be immediately opened to public inspection and publi- 
cized by the insurance cornrni~sioner.~~~ 
S. 243 responds to the Shavers court's concerns regarding the 
Automobile Placement Facility assigned risk plan13o by mandat- 
ing that the same variety of coverages be available through the 
facility as are available in the nonresidual market.131 It also re- 
quires that a rate classification plan for "clean risks" be filed with 
the commissioner and that  only commissioner-approved rates 
120. S .  127, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. (1979). 
121. Id. g 1210(1). 
122. S. 243, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. (1979). 
123. Id. $ 2027(a). 
124. Id. $ 2027(c). 
125. See 402 Mich. at 599, 267 N.W.2d at 87. 
126. S. 243, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. 9 2403(d) (1979). 
127. See 402 Mich. at 607-08, 267 N.W.2d at 91. 
128. S .  243, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. 9 2406(1) (1979). 
129. Id. $ 2406(2). 
130. 402 Mich. at 604-05, 267 N.W.2d at 89-90. 
131. S. 243, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. 9 3320(l)(b)(ii) (1979). 
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and rules be used on facility p01icies.l~~ 
The bill's provisions regarding hearings are particularly re- 
sponsive to the requirements of the Shavers court. The bill allows 
aggrieved parties to apply for a hearing before the insurance com- 
missioner in case of refusal, limitation, or nonrenewal of coverage 
based on prohibited f a ~ t 0 r s . l ~ ~  Although the bill does not specifi- 
cally allow a challenge to assignment to the Automobile Place- 
ment Facility, the hearing for refusal of insurance based on pro- 
hibited factors would allow such a challenge. In direct response 
to the concerns of the Michigan court,134 the bill allows aggrieved 
parties to apply for a hearing with regard to a proposed rate filing 
as well as an effective rate filing.135 
S. 243 appears to satisfy the concerns of the Shavers court 
and to provide due process to Michigan consumers with regard to 
no-fault automobile insurance. If enacted by the Michigan Legis- 
lature, it will be an important step toward an automobile insur- 
ance system that is fundamentally fair to consumers and to the 
insurance industry. 
D. Indications for Action in Other States and at the Federal 
Level 
At present, few states adequately protect their citizens in the 
no-fault automobile insurance area. For example, although 
twenty-four states provide some form of no-fault automobile lia- 
bility insurance,13%nly Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, 
132. Id. 5 3340. 
133. Id. § 2027(3). 
134. 402 Mich. at 601-03, 267 N.W.2d at 88-89. 
135. S. 243, 80th Mich. Leg., 1979 Reg. Sess. 5 2420 (1979). 
136. ARK. STAT. ANN. §$ 66-4014 to -4021 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §$ 10-4- 
701 to -723 (1974 & Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §$ 38-319 to -351 (West Supp. 
1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-.741 (West 
1972 & Supp. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §$56-3401b to -3414b 
(1977 & Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. $$  294-1 to -41 (1976 & Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. $9 40-3101 to -3121 (Supp. 1978); KY. REV. STAT. §§  304.39-010 to -340 (Supp. 197E); 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, 4 0  538-547 (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A-34N, 
ch. 231, § 6D (West 1969 & Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $8 500.3101-.3179 (Supp. 
1979-1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. $ 8  65B.41-.71 (West Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. $$ 
698.010-.510 (1973 & 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. $ 4  39.6A-1 to -20 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979- 
1980); N.Y. INS. LAW § §  670-678 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26- 
41-01 to -19 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. 743.800--835 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, $ #  
1009.101-.701 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); S.C. CODE $4 56-11-110 to -790 (1977 & Supp. 
1978); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. $9 58-23.6 to .8 (1978); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. tit. 14, 5 5.06- 
3 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978); UTAH CODE ANN. # §  31-41-1 to -13.4 (1974 & Supp. 1977); 
VA. CODE § 38.1-380.1 (Supp. 1979). 
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Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania provide 
for a hearing to aggrieved applicants or insureds.137 Legislators in 
no-fault states may wish to examine the opinion of the Michigan 
court in Shavers u. Attorney General, the Michigan Insurance 
Bureau's report on essential insurance,138 and the bills proposed 
in the Michigan Legi~laturel~~ for ideas on reforming their own 
statutes. 
The federal no-fault legislation introduced in the last session 
of Congress,14o supposedly based on the Michigan law that was 
invalidated by the Shavers case,141 contains the same flaws de- 
tected by the court in Shavers. The national bill requires that the 
compulsory insurance be available142 and sanctions insurance 
companies who unfairly cancel, fail to renew, or modify an in- 
sured's p01icy.l~~ However, the proposed act does not provide pro- 
cedures to be followed by an insured who feels that he or she has 
been unfairly treated, nor does it provide procedures for those 
who have been refused insurance to challenge the refusal. There 
is an assigned risk plan required by the bill,ld4 but it does not 
provide procedures to be followed by aggrieved insureds, nor does 
it mandate that residual coverage be comparable in quality to 
nonresidual ~0verage.l~~ If the federal legislation is considered by 
future sessions of Congress, the constitutional infirmities high- 
137. COLO. REV. STAT. $10-4-720 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-345 (West Supp. 
1979); HAW. REV. STAT. $8  294-13, -25,431-695, -699 (1976 & Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
$ 40-3118 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, $ 34H (West Supp. 1979); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. $ 500.2420 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. $ 4  65B.12, .19 (West Supp. 1979); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, $ 1008.5 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). 
138. ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 66. 
139. Notes 101, 104, 120, 122 supra. 
140. S. 1381, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S6339 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1977); 
H.R. 6601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H3537 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1977). 
141. Michigan no-fault ruling endangers federal bill, 64 A.B.A.J. 955 (1978); 21 ATLA 
L. REP. 242 (1978). 
142. S. 1381, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. $ 104(c), 123 CONG. REC. S6339, S6343 (daily ed. 
Apr. 25, 1977). 
143. Id. 8 108, 123 CONG. REC. a t  S6344. The proposed sanction is $50 per occurrence. 
144. Id. $ 106, 123 CONG. REC. at S6343. The statute does not specifically mandate 
an assigned risk plan, as opposed to some other type of residual facility (e.g., reinsurance 
plan), but the residual facility is described in terms of an assigned risk plan. 
145. The idea that all drivers in the assigned risk category are bad drivers and there- 
fore may "deserve" harsh treatment is not borne out by the fact that many "clean" risks 
are forced into the assigned risk category. See note 71 supra. 
146. S. 1381 and H.R. 6601 were not passed by the 95th Congress. See 47 U.S.L.W. 
2088 (1978). As of July 1979 no national no-fault bill had been introduced in the 96th 
Congress. 
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lighted by the Michigan court in Shavers should be cured, and 
the possible reforms outlined in the Michigan insurance commis- 
sioner's report to the Governor should be ~0nsidered.I~~ 
If the problem with no-fault insurance lies in its compulsory 
nature, it may be argued that the solution must lie in abolishing 
compulsory automobile liability insurance altogether. Since an 
adequate no-fault system must be comp~lsory,~~"he proposed 
solution would do away with no-fault insurance. This solution is 
undersirable for two reasons. First, a well-administered no-fault 
system is superior to the traditional fault-based reparations 
scheme. As the federal no-fault bill proposed in the 95th Congress 
explains, 
[the] traditional fault system denies more than half of the 
victims of motor vehicle accidents in the United States any 
benefits; is inefficient, incomplete, and slow; allocates benefits 
poorly; discourages rehabilitation; overburdens the courts; and 
does little if anything to minimize crash losses. . . . An ade- 
quate no-fault system delivers benefits to all victims rapidly and 
fairly; is efficient; provides for emergency medical services that 
can save lives and for rehabilitation services that can restore 
victims to productive lives; removes an unnecessary burden on 
the courts; contains incentives for improving motor vehicle 
safety; and is a desirable replacement for a traditional fault 
system or an inadequate no-fault system.14" 
Second, even if automobile insurance is not made compulsory by 
a state, it is a practical necessity for any responsible driver.150 The 
goal of fairly administered no-fault insurance can be effectively 
achieved through the private insurance delivery system without 
burdensome government interference. 151 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Michigan Supreme Court incorrectly applied the entitle- 
ment doctrine to complusory no-fault automobile insurance in 
Shavers v .  Attorney General. A correct application of the doctrine 
of present enjoyment would preclude the court's holding that 
certain procedural due process protections are required for Michi- 
147. ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 66. 
148. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 341-43. 
149. S. 1381, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. $ 2(5), (9), 123 CONG. REC. S6339, S6341 (daily 
ed. Apr. 25, 1977). 
150. ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 66, at 3-4. 
151. Id. at 61-75. .f 
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gan citizens seeking automobile insurance. Nevertheless, the 
court reached a desirable result. The compulsory nature of the 
insurance, the self-interest of the private insurance companies 
that provide the insurance, and the close connection of the insur- 
ance to personal freedom and pursuit of one's livelihood require 
that procedural due process protections be afforded those who 
seek compulsory insurance as well as those who currently enjoy 
its benefits. Other courts should follow the lead of the Michigan 
court and reconsider current application of the doctrine of entitle- 
ment to certain types of compulsory government-administered 
benefits, such as no-fault automobile insurance. 
Lisa Bolin Hawkins 
